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TEMPORARY TERMINATION: A LAYOFF LAW BLUEPRINT 





The current pandemic-induced unemployment crisis demands a new 
strategy for addressing temporary, economic-based terminations. 
Workplace regulation has long neglected workers separated for economic 
reasons, leaving the problem to the social welfare system, which has been 
overwhelmed by record numbers of unemployment applicants. In prior 
work, this author has called for laws requiring employers to provide 
mandatory advance notice of termination or commensurate severance pay 
to laid off workers. Building on that work, this article argues for recognizing 
“temporary separation” as a distinct legal status that confers individual 
rights to affected employees within the context of a comprehensive law of 
layoffs. Under this system, all workers terminated for economic reasons 
would be entitled to advance notice or its equivalent in severance pay. 
However, employers could suspend such obligations by classifying workers 
as temporarily separated. These individuals would retain their status as 
employees, obtain fast-track access to unemployment benefits, and enjoy a 
right to reinstatement when their jobs return. Should the employer choose 
not to recall a temporarily separated worker, or if the lack of work becomes 
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No statistic better captures the economic devastation of the COVID-19 
pandemic than the unemployment rate. Between March and July of 2020, 
over 50 million individuals lost their jobs in the wake of government shut 
down orders and the cessation of ordinary commercial life.1 There is no 
comprehensive data on the terms or effects of these many individual job 
losses, but we know anecdotally that, like everything about the pandemic, 
the pain has not been equally distributed.2 Some separated workers received 
generous severance pay from their employers, some more modest amounts, 
and some none at all.3  Some separated workers promptly secured 
unemployment insurance; some faced long delays and administrative 
hurdles.4 Perhaps most importantly, some separated workers have since 
returned to work, some still expect to return, and some have lost their jobs 
permanently.5 
This uncertainty and variability in workers’ experience of job loss owes 
 
1.   In the eighteen-week period between March 7, 2020 and July 4, 2020 there were more than 50 
million initial unemployment insurance claims filed. For comparison, in the eighteen-week period 
between October 5, 2019 and February 1, 2020, there were less than 4 million initial claims. See U.S. 
DEP’T. LAB., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY CLAIMS DATA 6 (July 4, 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf [https://perma.cc/37FB-TYJX]. 
2.   As has been widely reported, workers of color and low-wage workers have disproportionately 
suffered both the health effects and economic consequences of the pandemic. See  Elise Gould & Valerie 
Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting conditions for coronavirus – racism 
and economic inequality, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/ [https://perma.cc/K8SU-9FNK];  Mark Hugo 
Lopez, Lee Rainie & Abby Budiman, Financial and health impacts of COVID-19 vary widely by race 
and ethnicity, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 5, 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/05/05/financial-and-health-impacts-of-covid-19-vary-widely-by-race-and-
ethnicity/[https://perma.cc/6WSJ-7U4X]. 
3.   See infra Part II.B 
4.   See Tony Romm, Underfunded, understaffed and under siege: Unemployment offices 
nationwide are struggling to do their jobs, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/06/unemployment-benefits-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/LF3W-UW56]; infra Part II.B. 
5.   See, e.g., MGM Resorts lays off 18,000 furloughed workers, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2020) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/28/mgm-resorts-layoffs-furloughs/ 
[https://perma.cc/GAA7-CPV6] (reporting that of 62,000 workers initially furloughed during company 
closure, most have been called back to work and 18,000 have been terminated). At the height of 
government closures in May 2020, the vast majority of unemployed individual (more than 10 million of 













to a failure of law.6 The United States is unique among western countries in 
lacking what I have called a “law of layoffs.”7  Absent narrow 
circumstances, economic terminations are treated like any other at-will 
termination: employers are free to separate workers at their discretion 
without any obligation to cushion or support their transition out of work.  I 
refer to this regulatory vacuum as the “economic termination gap.”  
Elsewhere I have called for mandatory advance notice or commensurate 
severance pay to laid off workers.8  Such “separation rights,” as I now label 
them, are critically important in the COVID era, which has seen record-
breaking numbers of individuals out of work. Yet a unique aspect of the 
current crisis is that, for many affected workers, job separation was or will 
be a temporary event. Since government shut down orders began lifting 
during the summer of 2020, many (though far from all) workers have 
returned to their jobs, and others likely will still.  These workers are 
differently situated from those whose terminations are or will become 
permanent. For workers in the latter category, the goal of layoff law and 
policy is to transition them to new employment, perhaps in different sectors 
of the economy. In contrast, the goal with respect to those in the former 
category should be to maintain their workplace attachments and support 
them financially through what ideally will be a finite period out of work.  
This article argues for recognizing “temporary separation” as a distinct 
legal event that confers statutory rights to affected employees within the 
context of a comprehensive law of layoffs.  Under this system, all 
employees terminated for economic reasons would be entitled to advance 
notice or its equivalent in severance pay, as I have previously argued.9 In 
addition, however, employers would be permitted to suspend those 
obligations by classifying workers as temporarily separated. Like workers 
furloughed under collective bargaining agreements, these individuals would 
retain their status as employees, receive streamlined access to 
unemployment benefits, and be entitled to reinstatement when work 
 
6.   I use the term “economic termination” as shorthand for any termination based on business 
reasons unrelated to the employee, (i.e., a non-performance-based termination). This is without regard 
to how an employer administratively classifies the separation (e.g., layoff, reduction in force, etc.) as a 
matter of internal policy. 
7.   Rachel Arnow-Richman, Toward an American Law of Redundancy, 2 COMP. LAB. & SOC. 
SECURITY L. REV. 138, 138 (2017). 
8.   Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 2 (2010). 
9.   Id.  

















becomes available. Should the employer elect not to restore them, or the 
lack of work become permanent, the employer would be required to fulfill 
its deferred severance obligation.10 
Two disclaimers are in order. First, it is difficult to imagine expanding 
employers’ financial obligations in the current environment. Amidst the 
pandemic, and in other times of crisis, employers would likely require 
assistance in meeting the separation obligations called for in this article.11 
My project, however, is not to solve the insurmountable challenges 
presented by COVID-19, but rather to propose a long-term solution to the 
underlying problem of economic termination generally. Second, this article 
does not take a position on how Congress should allocate funds in 
responding to this or a comparable economic crisis. Some commentators 
have suggested that policies designed to maintain employment are 
preferable to those that expand unemployment benefits.12 However, the 
economic implications of different types of government interventions are 
beyond the scope of this project. I merely assert the importance of separation 
rights in imagining a coherent and compressive approach to regulating 
economic termination. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the dearth of 
protections for laid off workers. Workers have no separation rights upon 
termination for economic reasons other than in the event of a statutory 
“plant closing” or “mass layoff.” The rights they have in those narrow 
contexts prioritize formal notice of termination over actual income 
continuity, making them of limited value even where they apply. Part II 
discusses what this gap has meant for those I will call COVID-affected 
workers—individuals whose jobs have been temporarily or permanently 
eliminated due to the pandemic.13 In the absence of any background rights, 
 
10.  As will be discussed, this is the approach taken in much of Canada. See infra Part III.B. 
11.   For instance, in mandating paid leave in response to the pandemic, Congress authorized a 
tax credit to employers for the full amount of wages paid as qualified sick and family/medical leave. See 
Families First Coronavirus Response Act §§ 7001(a), 7003(a). 
12.   See, e.g., DAVID AUTOR ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 
USING ADMINISTRATIVE PAYROLL MICRODATA (2020), 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/20094?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/ADB8-QMJQ] 
(estimating that the Paycheck Protection Program, which provided forgivable loans to small employers 
conditioned on their maintaining employment rolls, boosted employment by 2 to 4.5 percent). 
13.   My focus is on workers affected by business slow-downs or closures. The rights of those 













workers’ access to severance pay or advance warning of job loss is the 
haphazard result of private ordering, placing outsized pressure on the 
unemployment system. Part III sketches a new law of layoffs focused on 
income continuity and job attachment. It imagines a system of mandatory 
advance notice of termination or severance pay for all employees with a safe 
harbor provision in the case of a statutorily defined temporary separation. 
Employers would avoid paying wages or severance during the statutory 
period, provided they reinstate the worker at its conclusion. Such a system 
would incent continued employer-specific attachment and ensure that 
employees have a period of income continuity in the event of a permanent 
job loss. 
 
I. THE ECONOMIC TERMINATION GAP  
 
There is nearly a total absence of federal or state law regulating 
economic termination generally, let alone in times of economic crisis.14 
Workers have no federal right to severance pay and only a limited right to 
advance notice of job loss.15 The only federal law that imposes obligations 
on employers in this context targets the narrow, though serious, problem of 
 
risk, as well as those with exceptional family responsibilities related to the virus are outside the scope 
of this article. Some of these issues are addressed elsewhere in this symposium. See Michele A. Travis, 
A Post-Pandemic Antidiscrimination Approach to Workplace Flexibility, 64 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 304 
(2021). 
14.   In general, federal and state employment protection legislation prohibits terminations 
effected for wrongful reasons such as those based on a worker’s protected characteristics, see, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin), rather than regulating those that are economically justified. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 7 
at 141–43 (attributing this focus to the predominance of lifecycle employment models during the mid-
twentieth century). 
15.   A handful of states have laws that purport to require employers to pay severance to terminated 
workers in specific situations, such as in the event of a corporate change in control. See RI ST § 28-7-
19.2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 625-B(2); 3 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 183(a); 4 15 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 2582(a); 6 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 473. However, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) preempts much of state law in this arena, see 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(a), rendering 
some of these so-called “tin parachute” laws of uncertain validity. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l 
Union Local 1468 v. Imperial Home Décor Group, 76 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (D.R.I. 1999) (finding that 
Rhode Island state law required employers to create an administrative scheme and was therefore 
preempted by ERISA); The Erisa Industry Committee v. Robert Asaro-Angelo, Docket No. 3:20-cv-
10094 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2020) (challenging recently enacted NJ law on preemption grounds). But see Fort 
Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) (upholding Maine severance law against 
preemption challenge because it merely involved “one-time, lump-sum payment triggered by a single 
event”). 

















company towns devastated by the loss of their primary source of jobs. The 
Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification (WARN) Act16 requires 
employers with one hundred employees or more to provide sixty days 
advance notice of any job loss caused by one of two major events: a “plant 
closing” affecting at least fifty employees17 or a “mass layoff” affecting at 
least fifty employees comprising at least a third of the workforce.18  The 
statute’s eponymous goal is to provide advance warning to vulnerable 
communities with the hopes that workers will have an opportunity to 
prepare for the loss.19 In other words, the statute aims to circumvent all-out 
destruction of local economies, not to remedy individual terminations. 
WARN’s narrow definitions of both covered employers and triggering 
events bear this out. WARN’s one-hundred employee threshold for 
employer coverage is the largest by far in the federal canon.20 Only about 
half of employers are even subject to the statute.21 Closures and layoffs by 
small to medium-sized businesses simply do not fall within its purview. 
Neither do modest-sized layoffs at large, covered employers, or those that, 
while meeting the fifty-person minimum do not affect at least a third of the 
employer’s workforce.22 The statute’s various coverage limits combine to 
 
16.   Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109. 
17.   Id. § 2101(a)(2).  
18.   Id. § 2101(a)(3). A layoff affecting 500 or more employees also triggers WARN Act duties 
without regard to the percentage of the workforce affected. Id. 
19.   See Weekes-Walker v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1199 
(M.D. Ala. 2012) (“The WARN Act’s legislative purpose is to secure for workers ample notice that their 
employment will be terminated so that they can better prepare themselves for reentry into the job 
market.”). 
20.   The workforce size threshold for employer coverage under WARN is twice that of the next 
highest among federal employment law statutes. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2611(4)(A)(i) (2018) (defining covered “employer” as one employing fifty or more employees). In 
contrast, federal antidiscrimination laws impose a fifteen to twenty employee threshold, depending on 
the particular statute. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (fifteen or more 
employees); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2018) (same); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (twenty or more employees). 
21.   According to Census Bureau statistics, as of 2017, U.S. businesses with more than 500 
employees employ 52.9%—just over half—of the private workforce. U.S. & STATES, TOTALS, 2017 
SUSB ANNUAL DATA TABLES BY ESTABLISHMENT INDUSTRY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html [https://perma.cc/QDR4-
GAFD]. This percentage is based on the foregoing data set which indicates that there were 68,035,731 
individuals working for businesses with 500 or more employees out of 128,591,812 total employees in 
the United States in 2017. 
22.   A study conducted shortly after WARN’s enactment concluded that the “one-third” 













make WARN inapplicable even to many mass termination events, which 
are in turn a mere subset of economic terminations generally.23  
Such are the limits of the law in ordinary times, and current times are 
far from ordinary. WARN contains two exceptions of particular relevance 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. First, the Act does not apply to temporary 
events. It defines an “employment loss” triggering WARN obligations as a 
job loss or a reduction-in-hours of fifty percent or more enduring for at least 
six months.24 This eliminates from coverage many of the COVID-related 
terminations that flowed from austere but temporary government shut down 
orders aimed at containing the virus. Ultimately some employers will be 
unable to survive such a dramatic, albeit short-lived, loss of business.25 In 
other cases, jobs will not return due to shifts in consumption patterns 
triggered by the pandemic.26  However, the employer’s duties under the Act 
 
OFF., GAO-03-1003, THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT: REVISING THE 
ACT AND EDUCATION MATERIALS COULD CLARIFY EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES AND EMPLOYEE 
RIGHTS 3 (2003) (concluding that employers were required to provide advance notice for approximately 
13 percent of mass layoffs compared to approximately 82 percent of 1,253 plant closures.”).  
23.   As an example, as a rough comparison, there were 127,821 seasonally adjusted initial jobless 
claims resulting from mass layoff events in May 2013, the last month for which Department of Labor 
mass layoff data is available, compared to 1,391,000 total seasonally adjusted initial claims in the four-
week period between May 4, 2013 through May 25, 2013. Compare Mass Layoff Statistics, U.S. 
BUREAU LAB. STATS., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ml (select “Mass layoff initial claimants, 
US (seasonally adjusted) - MLSMS00NN0119005”; then click “Retrieve data”) (last visited Aug. 22, 
2020) with Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Data, U.S. DEP’T LAB. EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., 
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp (select “National”; then click “Submit”) (last visited Aug. 
22, 2020). In other words, mass layoffs in the month of May 2013 accounted for only 9.19% of total 
initial unemployment claims in that same period. Indeed that percentage likely overstates the number of 
WARN-qualifying events insofar as the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines a “mass layoff” as one 
yielding at least fifty unemployment claims in a consecutive five-week period without regard to the size 
of the employer. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., MASS LAYOFF STATISTICS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, http://www.bls.gov/mls/mlsfaqs.htm[https://perma.cc/L9FR-TBRL] (2013).  
24.   29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6). 
25.   In hard hit sectors like retail, several long-established companies have already shuttered or 
declared bankruptcy. See Aisha Al-Muslim, Chapter 11 Business Bankruptcies Rose 26% in First Half 
of 2020, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chapter-11-business-bankruptcies-
rose-26-in-first-half-of-2020-11593722250 [https://perma.cc/ZUM5-G37U] (reporting that 3,600 
businesses filed for bankruptcy in the first six months of 2020, a 26% increase since the previous year); 
Abha Bhattarai, Pandemic bankruptcies: A running list of retailers that have filed for Chapter 11, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/27/retail-bankrupcy-
chapter11/ [https://perma.cc/53K9-MRY4] (cataloguing closures in the retail sector). 
26.   See Jose Maria Barrero et al., COVID-19 Is Also a Reallocation Shock (Becker Friedman 
Institute, Working Paper No. 59, 2020), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/BFI_WP_202059.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU9B-R56] (estimating that the COVID-19 
shock caused 3 new hires for every 10 layoffs and that 32-42% of COVID-induced layoffs will be 
 

















are triggered only when the employer can reasonably foresee that the layoff 
will become permanent.27  Until that point, there is no event requiring 
notice. 
Second, even permanent terminations are excepted from the Act if they 
result from an unforeseen business circumstance.28  According to 
Department of Labor regulations, these include circumstances “caused by 
some sudden, dramatic, and unexpected action or condition outside the 
employer’s control.”29 Along with the loss of a major client or supplier, the 
regulations single out as examples a “major economic downturn” and – 
especially relevant to the current situation – “government ordered 
closing”.30 In the face of such circumstances, the employer is excused from 
the sixty-day WARN Act obligation and required to give only what notice 
is practicable.31  
This unforeseen business circumstances, or “UBC,” exception is 
already a source of consternation for compliance-minded employers. Its 
application turns on the reasonable business judgment of the employer 
under the circumstances, making it highly fact-dependent.32 At some point, 
 
permanent); Zeynep Ton, Rebuilding the Economy Around Good Jobs, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 
2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/rebuilding-the-economy-around-good-jobs [https://perma.cc/K83N-
RX3Y] (stating the post-pandemic risks to traditional retailers due to the massive shift of consumers to 
online shopping). 
27.   EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LAB., THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING 
NOTIFICATION ACT: EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF CLOSINGS AND LAYOFFS 5 (2003), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/Layoff/pdfs/_EmployerWARN2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZKB5-DWCB] (explaining that if the extension of a temporary layoff beyond six 
months “occurs for reasons that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the layoff was originally 
announced, notice need only be given when the need for the extension becomes known”); United Steel 
Workers of Am. Local 2660 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 683 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding it was not 
foreseeable that the economic recession of 2008 would affect the U.S. Steel Industry until the sharply 
decreased demand for U.S. Steel in late November made layoff necessary); Roquet v. Arthur Andersen 
LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that although company was aware of economic 
recession as of October 2008, its full effect and impact on product demand were not apparent until late 
November in finding no WARN Act violation in steel company’s failure to provide sixty days’ notice); 
Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that notwithstanding five-
month investigation by Department of Justice in the wake of the Enron collapse, accounting firm’s 
closure was not foreseeable until DOJ indictment was handed down and its full scope became known).  
28.   29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A). 
29.   20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1) (2019). 
30.   Id.  
31.   Id. § 639.9; Newman v. Crane, Heyman, Simon, Welch, & Clar, 435 F. Supp. 3d 834, 842 
(N.D. Ill. 2020); Carroll v. World Mktg. Holdings, LLC, 418 F. Supp. 3d 299, 312 (E.D. Wis. 2019).  













the consequences of unforeseen events become foreseeable.33 With the 
pandemic now in its second year, a bumpy rollout to the vaccination 
program, and infection and death rates continuing to fluctuate, employers 
are likely aware that reduced operations, if not periodic shutdowns, will 
continue intermittently until the population achieves herd immunity.34 
However, the WARN Act contains a safe harbor for employers who act in 
good faith.35 Where an employer fails to notify based on a reasonable good 
faith belief that circumstances justify an exemption, the court may reduce 
or eliminate damages.36 Reliance on advice of counsel can demonstrate such 
a belief.37 
 
2004) (noting that the Department of Labor has declined to promulgate “per se rules as to what 
constitutes unforeseen business circumstances, and encourages a case-by-case examination of the 
facts”).  
33.   Compare Wholesale and Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc., 
826 F. Supp. 326, 333 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that, although the loss of the company’s sole customer 
was unforeseen, by February 23rd the employer should have anticipated the likely effects on its business 
and sent notification to its workers), and Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. MRC Indus. Grp., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that 
the failures of a potential sale “were neither hidden nor imagined” and could not excuse the employer’s 
failure to send notice to its workers, with In re Advanced Accessory Systems, LLC, 443 B.R. 756, 766 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (finding that the loss of 95% of the employer’s business within a twenty-four 
hour period was unforeseen and the employer was not in violation for failure to provide notice), and 
United Steel Workers of Am. Local 2660 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 683 F.3d 882, 887–89 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(noting that although the economic recession was foreseeable, the sharply reduced demand for steel was 
not, in concluding that employer could rely on the unforeseen business circumstance exception). 
34.   For instance, spikes in infection and death rates in October 2020 led to a second round of shut 
down orders in some European countries.Aurelien Breede et al., France and Germany Announce New 
Restrictions as Cases Surge in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/28/world/covid-19-coronavirus-updates 
[https://perma.cc/77M4-MEG7];Mitch Smith, The U.S. Hits the 9-Million Mark as Infections Keep 
Surging, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020,) https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/29/world/covid-19-
coronavirus-updates [https://perma.cc/86ZM-GNZC], and new temporary and permanent layoffs 
continued even as some laid off workers are began to be called back. See Jeanna Smialek, et al., Workers 
Face Permanent Job Losses as the Virus Persists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/business/economy/coronavirus-permanent-job-losses.html 
[https://perma.cc/J4R3-ZGT7]. 
35.   29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4) (“If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to the 
satisfaction of the court that the act or omission that violated this chapter was in good faith . . . the court 
may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of the liability or penalty provided for in this section.”). 
36.   Kildea v. Electro Wire Prods., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 238 
F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing “complete reduction” in damages); Int’l Ass'n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1993) 
(same); Watts v. Marco Holdings, L.P., N0. 14-00002, 1998 WL 211770, at *2 (N.D. Miss. 1998) 
(allowing 50% reduction). 
37.   Kildea, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 713); In re Old Electralloy Corp., 162 B.R. 121, 126 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1993). 

















Indeed, there is fairly strong consensus among lawyers and government 
regulators that the COVID-19 pandemic and economic shutdown are 
textbook examples of the unfair business circumstances exception. 
Management-side lawyers have cautiously counseled their clients that they 
can rely on the defense,38 and the Department of Labor has all but 
greenlighted this position in publicly posted guidance.39 Litigation initiated 
thus far invokes the defense.40 Meanwhile, state lawmakers have taken steps 
to allow employers within their jurisdiction to avoid more onerous state law 
obligations.41  
 
38.   Andrea R. Calem et al., COVID-19 and the “Unforeseen Business Circumstances” 
Exception to WARN Notification, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.huntonlaborblog.com/2020/03/articles/employment-policies/covid-19-and-the-
unforeseen-business-circumstances-exception-to-warn-notification/ [https://perma.cc/9F2J-264] 
(observing that “the COVID-19 pandemic seems to fit comfortably within [the UBC] exception”); 
COVID-19 and Workforce Reductions: Federal and California WARN Act Considerations for 
Employers, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/covid-19-and-workforce-reductions-federal-and-
california-warn-act-considerations-for-employers.html [https://perma.cc/6VPP-XLHQ] (discussing 
unforeseeable business circumstances as “likely to apply during the crisis that is unfolding from COVID-
19”). 
39.   U.S. DEP’T LAB., WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 2, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/Layoff/pdfs/WARN%20FAQ%20for%20COVID19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GMU-87D9] (“recommending that employers consider the unforeseeable business 
circumstances exception in determining whether to abide by the notice requirement”). 
40.   See, e.g., Amended Order at 12, Benson v. Enterprise Holdings, No. 6:20-cv-891-RBD-LRH 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4 2021, (refusing to grant defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss complaint based on 
the unforeseen business circumstances defense, noting that while the defense may apply, “[e]xactly when 
Defendants had to give notice will doubtless be a hotly contested factual issue”). The district court also 
rejected Enterprise’s invocation of the Act’s “natural disaster” exception, but certified this part of its 
order for interlocutory review. Id. at 10-12; Order at 4, Benson v. Enterprise Holdings, No. 6:20-cv-891-
RBD-LRH (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4 2021.). 
41.   Several states have so-called “mini”-WARN acts that are more generous to workers than the 
federal act. Notably, in California, where state law lacks both the temporary layoff and UBC exceptions, 
Governor Newsom temporarily adopted an equivalent to the federal UBC exception via executive order 
for the duration of the pandemic. CAL. EXEC. ORDER N-31-20 (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.17.20-EO-motor.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4BV-
KGF2]; cf. NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF LABOR, 
https://labor.ny.gov/workforcenypartners/warn/warnportal.shtm [https://perma.cc/725R-86SN] 
(directing employers to provide notice “as soon as possible,” noting that state law “recognizes that 
businesses cannot predict sudden and unexpected circumstances beyond an employer’s control, such as 
government-mandated closures, the loss of your workforce due to school closings, or other specific 
circumstances due to the coronavirus pandemic.) In New Jersey, the legislature has delayed the effective 
date a novel, recently enacted state severance pay law that would have gone into effect as of July 2020. 













Actions such as these make apparent that the WARN Act’s limits in the 
present moment have less to do with the Act’s coverage thresholds than with 
its overall approach to economic termination. The WARN Act envisions 
massive dislocation events as a business decision – the product of strategic 
planning by corporate executives determining how best to weather 
economic shifts in their particular industry. It ensures that when companies 
elect to downsize, offshore, or close shop altogether, employees are not the 
last to know. The Act has little to say about global economic events, let 
alone those as colossal and unprecedented as COVID-19 during which 
advance notice – the single obligation imposed on employers – is all but 
impossible.42  
In the same way, the WARN Act fails to consider the most profound 
implication of economic termination for workers: loss of livelihood. This is 
because the Act is trained on reemployment, rather than income continuity, 
as its fundamental goal. The assumption is that advance notice will give 
workers time to line-up other work, ideally avoiding any gap in pay. 
Whether notice realistically achieves that goal in the context of a planned 
event, one that is clearly within the statute’s reach, is an open question.43 
 
date 90 days after the termination of state executive order declaring public health emergency due to 
COVID-19). 
42.   The WARN Act has garnered much criticism from legal scholars, lawyers, and policy 
makers, on such matters as the Act’s coverage limitations, the scope of its exceptions, and the rate of 
employer violations. See, e.g., Tonya M. Cross, Failure to WARN: A Proposal That the WARN Act 
Provide a Compensatory, Make-Whole Remedy for UnWARNed Employees, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 
723 (2003) (asserting that ambiguities about the scope of WARN Act liability incentivize employers to 
“play the odds” in favor of non-compliance); Parisis G. Filippatos & Sean Farhang, The Rights of 
Employees Subjected to Reductions in Force: A Critical Evaluation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 263, 
324–25 (2002) (describing the Act as “riddled with exceptions, exemptions, and excuses for non-
compliance”); Alan B. Krueger, Lessons From the Chicago Sit-In, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Dec. 15, 
2008, 6:30 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/lessons-from-the-chicago-sit-
in/#more-721 [https://perma.cc/8ZJH-4QD7] (“[T]he law applies in only a minority of plant closings 
and mass layoffs, and apparently it is widely violated, with little consequence, when it does apply.”); 
Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking is Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, 
and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y 
J 55, 74 (asserting that the perverse consequence of WARN’s exceptions is that “the very real and 
tangible effects” of the precipitating circumstances “are borne not by the employer, who arguably is in 
a better position to bear those burdens, [but rather] by the workers”). Prior to the pandemic, efforts were 
afoot to expand the Act’s reach and the available remedies for violations. See Fair Warning Act of 2019, 
S. 2938 (116th Cong. 2019) (extending WARN Act coverage to employers with fifty or more employees, 
requiring an additional thirty days’ notice, and providing for liquidated damages in the event of a 
violation). Those efforts would not have changed the law’s limited applicability to the current situation. 
43.   Compare U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STATS., WORKER DISPLACEMENT: 2015-2017 2, 
 

















What is certain is that rights to notice are all but meaningless in the current 
pandemic in which entire segments of the economy are shut down or just 
barely operating. In this situation, workers do not need time to find new 
work, they need a source of income to hold them over until their jobs return. 
As the next section describes, many COVID-affected workers lack that 
economic cushion. 
 
II. THE INCOME CONTINUITY CRISIS  
 
The previous section described the economic termination gap. This 
section discusses what it has meant for COVID-affected workers. Absent 
regulatory law establishing worker separation rights, access to continued 
pay for individuals permanently or temporarily laid off depends on the 
private choice of their employer. For workers whose employers do not 
voluntarily provide severance, the only recourse is the public benefits 
system, which has been overwhelmed by the number of unemployment 
applicants.44 The result is that many COVID-affected workers have found 
themselves suddenly jobless, with only their last paycheck in hand and 
uncertain access to the public safety net. 
 
A. A Freedom of Contract Free-for-All 
 
A potential source of income continuity for COVID-affected workers is 
employer-administered severance pay. Some employers choose to provide 
some amount of continued pay upon termination, despite the absence of 
legal mandates. For high-level executives and unionized workers, 
“voluntary severance,” as I refer to it, is a negotiated term of employment 
that is memorialized in the governing employment contract or collective 
 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/disp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E7K-H89M] (finding that 
reemployment rates were not statistically different for workers who received written advanced notice 
and those who did not) with GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DISLOCATED WORKERS: WORKER 
ADJUSTMENT & RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT NOT MEETING ITS GOALS 6 (1993), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/153184.pdf [https://perma.cc/989S-2KCA] (reporting that “[a]bout 47 
percent of the employers who gave a WARN notice reported that, as a result of providing advance notice, 
their workers found jobs more quickly than they would have otherwise”). Ultimately the usefulness of 
advance notice is market dependent, turning on the availability of other jobs in the region and sector 
and/or the affected workers’ ability to relocate or reskill.  












bargaining agreement.45 For most workers, however, access to voluntary 
severance turns on the employer’s internal policies or practices. In other 
words, it depends on the employer’s unilateral choices about how it wants 
to handle terminations. 
There is little meaningful data on the pervasiveness of voluntary 
severance.46 Some private sources suggest that nearly ninety percent of 
employers offer severance to at least some employees.47 However, such data 
are based on self-reports by larger, more sophisticated employers.48 In 
addition, such firm-level data can mask differences in coverage. Companies 
may choose to provide severance only to a portion of their workforce, most 
often to executive officers and managers, less frequently to the rank-and-
file.49  
Moreover, it can be difficult to know whether voluntary severance is 
being consistently applied. Only about half of reporting employers offering 
severance provide a standardized benefit to all eligible employees.50 
Practices vary in formality with some companies maintaining established 
policies and others operating more case-by-case.51 Finally, severance 
 
45.   See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 250–51 (2006) (finding 
that nearly 90 percent of sampled CEO contracts provided for continued salary to the executive for a 
period of time following a termination not based on performance-related cause); COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS MANUAL, BLOOMBERG LAW, § 123.01 et 
seq. (last visited Oct. 20, 2020) (providing sample contract clauses guaranteeing severance pay upon 
layoff to unionized workers). 
46.   Most information comes from private consulting firms rather than independent government 
sources.  See DONALD O. PARSONS, INST. LAB. ECON., VOLUNTARY EMPLOYER-PROVIDED SEVERANCE 
PAY4, 7–10 (2017) (discussing historical sources and limits of privately compiled survey data).  
47.   See, e.g., RISESMART, 2017 GUIDE TO SEVERANCE & WORKFORCE TRANSITION 8–9 (2017), 
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/1866346/Assets/2017-Guide-to-Severance-3b.pdf?t=1516320202326 
[https://perma.cc/7G8Y-HKG2]. 
48.   See id. (surveying companies with 500 employees or more). In addition, private data sources 
rely on surveys of human resource professionals meaning they do not sample companies too small to 
retain someone in this position. See, e.g., id.; LEE HECHT HARRISON, SEVERANCE & SEPARATION 
BENEFITS 2 (8th ed. 2020). 
49.   Id. at 13 (finding that, of organizations offering severance to some rather than all workers, 
eighty-seven percent cover officers and senior executives, eighty percent cover managers and 
professionals, and sixty-one percent cover clerical workers).  
50.   Id. at 14. 
51.   See LEE HECHT HARRISON, SEVERANCE & SEPARATION BENEFITS 8 (8th ed. 2020), Severance 
Separation Benchmark Study (on file with author or by request at 
https://info.lhh.com/severancestudy2020.us) (reporting that fifty-one percent of responding employers 
maintain a formal written plan, while just over thirty percent rely on written guidelines).  Notably, 
 

















policies can be easily suspended or modified.  Those that are relatively 
informal are likely non-contractual and subject to unilateral revocation.52 
Those that are more formalized and more complex likely qualify as welfare 
plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).53 
Participants in those plans will have viable claims if they do not receive 
authorized payments.54 However, federal law does not restrict employers 
from altering its plans, nor does it require advance notice of those changes.55 
As a practical matter then, the terms of COVID-related separations 
depend on the employer’s judgment as to what it is able and willing to do 
to facilitate the layoff. The result is that the experiences of COVID-affected 
workers have varied dramatically. At least some terminated employees have 
received generous payouts. Notably, Airbnb laid off twenty-five percent of 
its workforce with fourteen weeks of pay plus one week per year of 
service.56 Yet, that experience is far from the norm.  Other companies have 
let go or furloughed employees with little to no warning or pay, sometimes 
compounding workers’ distress with minimal or unclear information about 
 
companies are more likely to rely on formal plans with professional and managerial employees than with 
the rank-and-file. See id. at 8-9 (reporting that less than forty percent of companies maintain formal 
policies for non-exempt workers versus over seventy percent for executives and managers). 
52.   The contractual enforceability of a personnel policy depends on the reasonable expectations 
of the employee. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985). Most 
courts hold that a prominent disclaimer and/or reservation of rights to modify will insulate the employer 
from liability for altering or failing to abide by its policies. See, e.g., id. at 1271; Sutula-Johnson v. 
Office Depot, Inc., 893 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2018) Romstad v. City of Colo. Springs, 650 Fed. Appx. 
576, 580 (10th Cir. 2016); Hackney v. Lincoln Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 657 Fed. Appx. 563, 574 (6th Cir. 
2016). Moreover, even contractual policies may, in most jurisdictions, be unilaterally modified in or, in 
a minority, modified upon the provision of any form of additional consideration to the employee. See 
generally Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427 (2016) 
(discussing and critiquing both approaches). 
53.   See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987). 
54.   See 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
55.   Employers must provide employees notice of material modifications to plans no later than 210 
days after the close of the plan year for which the modification was adopted. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3. 
However, employers need not provide advance notice, provided that they do not misrepresent or, upon 
inquiry, fail to disclose anticipated changes. See McAuley v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 
1043 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that where plan changes are under “serious consideration,” the employer 
has a “fiduciary duty not to intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent the plans terms to 
participants.”). 
56.   Elisabeth Buchwakd, Airbnb Will Give Laid-off Employees 14 weeks Base Pay and Health 














the separation terms.57 Some examples reveal an acute lack of empathy. In 
a surprise two-minute video, the CEO of Cirque du Soleil notoriously laid 
off ninety-five percent of its workforce with no severance pay or, 
purportedly, access to paid time off.58 
Thus, voluntary severance is highly precarious. Where it exists, it 
provides a valuable source of temporary income continuity for separated 
workers. Yet there is neither consistency nor predictability as to its 
availability, enforceability, or basic terms. In other words, the COVID-19 
employment crisis is a private ordering free-for-all. 
 
B. The Catch-as-Catch-Can Safety Net 
 
The backstop on these free market dynamics is the public benefits 
system. The joint state-federal unemployment insurance (UI) program, 
established by the 1935 Social Security Act, provides temporary partial 
income replacement to workers separated from employment for non-
performance-based reasons.59 Workers qualify for UI based on their past 
workforce attachment irrespective of need.60 Their benefits are calculated 
based on their earning history pursuant to a state-determined rate and cap.61 
In many ways, the UI system is the ideal mechanism for managing the 
COVID employment crisis. It was designed to address widespread 
 
57.   Gaby Del Valle, Laid-off Workers Are Getting Bad Severance Packages, and Worse 
Communication, from Their Employers, VOX (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2020/3/27/21195664/coronavirus-layoffs-furlough-severance [https://perma.cc/SJ6E-F462]. 
58.   Emily Alford, In the Time it Takes to Boil Instant Rice, Cirque du Soleil's CEO Fired 
Thousands of Employees via Bizarre Video, JEZEBEL (Mar. 19, 2020), https://jezebel.com/in-the-time-
it-takes-to-boil-instant-rice-cirque-du-so-1842415332 [https://perma.cc/4PDC-F9EF]; see also Jennifer 
Liu, ‘Like a kid whose parents are withholding critical information’: How workers feel about virtual 
layoffs, CNBC (May 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/08/how-workers-really-feel-about-
virtual-layoffs.html [https://perma.cc/87N7-TLTX] (providing similar examples). 
59.   42 U.S.C. §§ 501–504 (2006). For background on the formation and purpose of the UI system, 
see UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES 3–12 
(Christopher J. O'Leary & Stephen A. Wandner eds., 1997); Arnow-Richman, supra note 8 at 41–44; 
Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 340–43 
(2001). I draw on these sources throughout this section. 
60.   See UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE supra note 59 at 164–65 (describing how that the idea of 
basing benefits on need was “rejected at the outset” of the system’s creation); Lester, supra note 59 at 
341 (noting that UI is “not means tested” but rather “recognize[s] the pure harm of downward mobility”). 
61.   Average weekly benefit ranges from just under $200 per week in states with the lowest rates 
up to over $500 per week in those with the highest rates. U.S. DEP’T LAB., Summary Data For State 
Programs, By State Report For 04/2020, https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claimssum.asp (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2020). 

















unemployment in times when replacement work may not be readily 
available.62 It gives workers an economic cushion to ride out difficult times, 
and it supports the economy generally by boosting consumer spending.63 To 
the extent COVID-19 is an exogenous event, affecting all workers and 
businesses in shutdown industries irrespective of fault, it makes sense to 
handle the fallout through a national insurance system.  
Yet, there are aspects of UI that make it an odd tool for managing the 
current crisis. UI is not designed to compensate for lost income, but rather 
the inability to find replacement work. In ordinary times, weekly benefits 
average about half of a worker’s prior wages.64 The aim is to incent 
continued labor market participation rather than reliance on the public 
coffer.65 This reemployment goal is reinforced by eligibility requirements 
that turn on work search behavior. Ordinarily, a waiting period applies 
between job loss and benefit eligibility, during which the applicant 
ostensibly seeks new employment.66 Applicants must continue their job 
search efforts during the benefits period and lose eligibility if they decline 
 
62.   Arnow-Richman, supra note 8 at 43 (“Unemployment insurance is a government-sponsored 
system of pooling funds to hedge against the risk that new work might not be available.”). 
63.   See UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, supra note 59 at 182 (describing goal of UI “to stabilize 
aggregate spending by maintaining purchasing power during economic down turns”); Lester, supra note 
59 at 342 (describing UI as “part of a broader program of Keynesian demand stabilization”); Walter 
Nicholson, The Evolution of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 123, 124–25 (2007) (discussing “consumption smoothing” goals of unemployment insurance).  
64.   In the last complete quarter prior to the pandemic for instance, the replacement rate ranged 
from approximately 54% in the highest paying state (Hawaii) to 31% in the lowest(Arkansas). DEP’T 
OF LABOR, UI Replacement Rates Report Q4 2019, 
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp (last visited August 23, 2020); see also 
Manuel Alcalá Kovalski & Louise Sheiner, How Does Unemployment Insurance Work? And How is it 
Changing During the Coronavirus Pandemic?, BROOKINGS (July 20, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/20/how-does-unemployment-insurance-work-and-
how-is-it-changing-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/4KWW-GG8U]. 
65.   See Sachin S. Pandya, Retrofitting Unemployment Insurance to Cover Temporary Workers, 
17 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 907, 908–09 (1999) (describing the “claimant-side moral hazard problem” 
whereby benefit recipients reduce efforts to find reemployment, shifting the costs of their unemployment 
onto the system). 
66.   The period may be short, as little as one week in some states. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT LAWS 2019 (Jan. 1, 2019), 
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/comparison/2010-2019/comparison2019.asp [https://perma.cc/WJ44-
N2WZ]. However, the requirement reflects the underlying premise that an applicant qualifies for UI not 













suitable employment. 67  
Given its focus on reemployment, UI is an awkward vehicle for 
addressing temporary separation, in which workers are laid off for 
ostensibly finite intervals with a mutual expectation of rehire. Such is the 
case for many COVID-affected workers whose jobs were lost as a direct 
result of government shutdown orders. These individuals are not working 
but, depending on their understanding with their prior employer, may not be 
seeking new work.68 Indeed, searching for work is of little value to them (or 
the system) at a time when much of the work in their field or industry has 
ground to a halt.  
In response to the pandemic, both Congress and the states augmented 
and modified UI in ways that make the system operate more like wage 
replacement than unemployment insurance. The Federal Pandemic 
Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) program authorized under the 
CARES Act, provided an additional $600 per week to any worker receiving 
UI.69 That amount was calculated to replace one hundred percent of the 
mean U.S. wage when combined with the mean state UI benefit.70 On the 
 
67.   See Lester supra note 59 at 352–53 (describing UI’s continuing eligibility requirements, 
including availability for work, active searching, and willingness to accept suitable work). A difficult 
question is what constitutes suitable work given the pandemic.  Workers may decline offers of 
employment due to health concerns if the job places them at risk of contracting the virus. See Jack Healy, 
Workers Fearful of the Coronavirus Are Getting Fired and Losing Their Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/virus-unemployment-fired.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q59S-CYCW]. At least some states have provided guidance to the effect that such 
workers can still qualify for UI. See, e.g., 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-2, pt. 4.3.2.1 (2020); MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, SUITABLE WORK AND REFUSAL TO WORK, 
https://www.michigan.gov/leo/0,5863,7-336-94422_97241_98585_100420---,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/W57M-SGJ3]; TEXAS WORKFORCE COMM’N, TEXAS WORKFORCE COMM’N 
GUIDANCE TO UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMANTS, https://www.twc.texas.gov/texas-workforce-commission-
guidance-unemployment-claimants [https://perma.cc/3MKL-EMMV]. Elsewhere this remains 
uncertain. 
68.   See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(12) (2020). As previously noted, some temporary terminations will 
likely ripen into permanent ones – either because the worker’s employer does not survive to re-open 
following a government shut down or because its business does not rebound sufficiently to justify 
reestablishing its pre-COVID employment levels. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, even if an employer experiences a renewed need for labor, in an employment-at-will system 
it has no obligation to re-hire a particular worker, even if it previously designated a layoff as temporary. 
I will return to this separate problem in infra Part III. 
69.   See CARES Act 2104(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 9023 (2020). This includes so-called “gig” workers 
and other independent contractors who are receiving benefits under Congress’ expanded eligibility 
program. See Id. at 2102(c)(2). 
70.   Early evidence suggests that the median replacement rate is 134 percent with a large number 
 

















state level, some states suspended their work search requirements or 
funneled cases into pre-COVID exemption processes for work search 
waivers.71  Some also authorized extensions in benefits.72   
These are positive changes in terms of increasing the amount and 
availability of income continuity. However, they have added layers of 
complexity on top of an administrative process that was already strained 
prior to the pandemic.73 At the peak of the crisis, workers faced 
extraordinary delays simply in applying for benefits only to wait weeks for 
offices to process their claims.74 Backlogs continued even after initial filings 
 
of workers receiving benefits in excess of their prior wages. Peter Ganong et al., US Unemployment 
Insurance Replacement Rates During the Pandemic 1 (Becker Friedman Inst. Working Paper No. 27216, 
2020), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/b/1275/files/2020/05/rep_rate-5-15-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG3S-WBSX]. 
71.   See, e.g., An Act Authorizing Waiver Of The 1-Week Waiting Period For Unemployment 
Benefits, 2020 Mass. Acts Ch. 40 (Massachusetts) 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2020/Chapter40;  Reemployment Assistance 
Resource Guide - COVID-19, FL DP’T OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,  (December 30, 2020) 
https://floridajobs.org/docs/default-source/reemployment-assistance-center/new-individual-faq-
includes-cares-act-final.pdf?sfvrsn=5f2547b0_70 (last visited January 3, 2021) (Florida); EDD 
Disaster-Related Services, CA Employment Development Dep’t, 
https://www.edd.ca.gov/about_edd/disaster_related_services.htm (last visited January 4, 2021) 
(California);  
 cf. CARES Ac 2102(3)(A)(ii(I) (waiving work search requirement under the FPUC for individuals 
unable to work due to COVID-related health issues, COVID-related childcare responsibilities, or the 
need to quarantine. 
72.   See e.g., CA Emp. Dev. Dep’t, FED-ED Extension (2021), 
https://www.edd.ca.gov/about_edd/coronavirus-2019/fed-
ed.htm#:~:text=With%20new%20legislative%20changes%20adopted,a%20period%20of%20high%20
unemployment [https://perma.cc/E3UL-QKCQ] (providing up to 20 weeks of additional benefits); NJ 





73.   See Michele Evermore, National Employment Law Project, Policy Brief, Long Lines for 
Unemployment: How Did We Get Here and What Do We Do Now?, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 21, 
2020), https://www.nelp.org/publication/long-lines-for-unemployment-how-did-we-get-here-and-
what-do-we-do-now/ [https://perma.cc/7VQD-6T5L]; Olivia Solon & April Glaser, A ‘perfect storm’ 
for chaos: Unemployment system’s failures were a long time coming, NBC NEWS (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/decade-neglect-has-caught-u-s-unemployment-
offices-n1205056 [https://perma.cc/M284-7YCG]. 
74.   See Patrick McGeehan, ‘I Cry Night and Day’: How It Took One Woman 8 Weeks to Get 
Unemployment, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/nyregion/unemployment-benefits-ny-coronavirus.html 













tapered,75 with some workers awaiting payment months after applying.76 
Others gave up on seeking benefits altogether.77 Anecdotal reports of phone 
calls going unanswered, filing systems that crash, demands for repeat 
applications, and workers queueing (even camping out) at local offices 
revealed the extent of workers’ frustration and desperation.78  
In sum, UI has proved to be an unstable and awkward foundation on 
which to construct a wage replacement system. Present overreliance on the 
public safety net has overwhelmed an important failsafe that otherwise 
keeps workers out of poverty in the event of unemployment. Workers have 
been left stranded. 
 
III.  TOWARD A LAW OF LAYOFFS   
 
The previous section described how the economic termination gap has 
left COVID-affected workers struggling with sudden unemployment and 
only haphazard access to continued pay or public benefits. Yet this article’s 
purpose is not to critique either the corporate or government response to 
what are truly unprecedented circumstances. The point rather is that the 
exigencies of the pandemic bring to light a long-neglected flaw in the pre-
existing regulatory framework: there is no reliable just-in-time source of 
continued pay, nor any form of separation rights, for laid-off workers. This 
contrasts with other public and private systems that grant workers distinct 
 
an Unemployed Person’, N.Y. TIMES (April 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us/florida-coronavirus-unemployment.html 
[https://perma.cc/5LFV-X2CY]. 
75.   After hitting a high of 6,867,000 seasonally adjusted initial UI claims in the week of March 
28, 2020, initial UI claims declined and are currently hovering at approximately 800,000 seasonally 
adjusted initial UI claims per week since the end of August 2020. See U.S. DEP’T. LAB., 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY CLAIMS DATA, https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf 
[https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf] (Oct. 22, 2020). 
76.   Eli Rosenberg, Workers Are Pushed to the Brink as They Continue to Wait for Delayed 
Unemployment 
Payments, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/13/unemployment-payment-delays/ 
[https://perma.cc/TWD6-S4M8]. 
77.   Ben Zipperer & Elise Gould, Unemployment Filing Failures: New Survey Confirms that 
Millions of Jobless Were Unable to File an Unemployment Insurance Claim, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 
28, 2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-filing-failures-new-survey-confirms-that-millions-
of-jobless-were-unable-to-file-an-unemployment-insurance-claim/ [https://perma.cc/9JJT-KJT6]. 
78.   See Rosenberg, supra note 76. 

















separation rights imposed through direct obligations on employers.79  
This section issues a renewed call for the adoption of such a system. As 
I have argued elsewhere, Congress should enact a “law of layoffs” that 
would require employers to provide severance pay to terminated workers 
where they are either unable or chooses not to provide advance notice of 
termination.80 Adding to this work, I propose the creation of a deferral 
option, similar to what exists in Canada, for terminations formally classified 
as temporary. Workers would receive streamlined access to UI during the 
temporary period, after which employers could choose either to reinstate 
them or pay their deferred severance obligation. 
 
A. Severance Pay as a Separation Right  
 
The pandemic makes stark that what workers need most following an 
unanticipated termination is money in hand. A law of layoffs begins with a 
universal right to severance pay that addresses this problem. Companies 
should be obligated, as a matter of course, to provide some amount of 
continued pay in situations involving economic termination.81  
Such a requirement is a standard feature of the regulatory infrastructure 
of many legal systems outside the fifty states where severance pay is a basic 
workplace right.82 Within the United States, severance pay is a frequent term 
of collective bargaining agreements covering unionized workers and is 
often coupled with other separation rights.83 Severance pay is also a 
component of the federal merit system that governs and protects federal 
 
79.   See infra Part III.A. 
80.  See Arnow-Richman, supra note 7; Arnow-Richman, supra note 8. 
81.   A typical model for voluntary and negotiated severance plans is to provide a certain number 
of weeks’ pay per year of service. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & 
CONTRACTS MANUAL, BLOOMBERG LAW, §§ 123.111-123.17 (providing sample clauses from 
union contracts); HECHT HARRISON, supra note 51 at 12–17 (providing breakdown of common 
calculations by industry, employer size, and employee position). In the federal merit system, employees 
receive one week per year of service up to ten years of service, and two weeks per year of service 
thereafter, with a substantial added allowance for individuals over age forty. 5 U.S.C. § 5595(c).  
82.   See, e.g., Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, Part XI, § 135 (Eng.) (requiring “redundancy” 
payments); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185m (2005) (requiring severance absent just cause to 
terminate); cf. Ontario Employment Standards Act, 2000 S.O., c. 41, s. 54, 61 (Can.) (providing for 
advance notice of termination or its equivalent in termination pay).  For comparative treatment of these 
different systems, see generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 55–57 (highlighting select statutes). 
83.   See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS 
MANUAL, BLOOMBERG LAW, § 123.01 et seq. (last visited Oct. 20,2020) (surveying clauses 













There are many justifications, both doctrinal and normative, for making 
severance pay a universal entitlement, which I have advanced elsewhere.85 
For present purposes what is important is that severance serves as an 
alternative to advance notice in situations where the latter is impossible.86 
Employees need some warning of termination in order to begin preparing 
for the loss – whether by searching for new work, retooling, or simply 
saving money. This is the rationale behind the WARN Act, which seeks to 
avoid the particularly devastating economic effects of numerous job losses 
in one geographic location,87 but it applies equally to all terminations.88 The 
broader concept is recognized and codified in commercial contract law 
which requires reasonable notice when terminating any ongoing 
relationship of indefinite duration.89 Should a contracting party fail to 
comply, its affected partner has a cause of action for expected benefits 
during the notice period. In the case of employment, which is also an 
indefinite contractual relationship, severance pay is the equivalent.90  
Of course, many employers currently face dire financial circumstances 
and it can be difficult to imagine expanding their financial obligations at 
this time. This is particularly true given the unforeseeability of the pandemic 
 
84.   5 U.S.C. § 5595. 
85.   Arnow-Richman, supra note 8. 
86.  In my prior work, I have referred to this as a pay-or-play system in which the employer may 
“play,” i.e., continue to use the worker’s services during the notice period, or simply “pay” out on its 
wage obligation for that period. Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 7.  In Canada this relationship between 
pay and notice is framed explicitly in the governing statutory law. See, e.g., Ontario Employment 
Standards Act, 2000 S.O., c. 41, s. 54, 61 (Can.); see generally DAVID DOOREY, THE LAW OF WORK 
322–23 (2d ed. 2020). 
87.   See supra Part I. 
88.   This obligation to provide advance warning or continued pay is also justified under implicit 
contract theory as the embodiment of contemporary employers’ commitment to “employability.” 
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 192 (1997); see generally Katherine 
V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and 
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 525 (2001) (discussing the new social contract under which 
employees trade organizational citizenship behavior for the promise of marketability). In a dynamic 
economy, in which fewer employers guarantee long-term employment, it makes sense to require the 
employer who has benefited from workers’ loyalty and commitment to bear some responsibility for the 
cost of their transition to other employment, either through advance warning or through post-termination 
severance. See generally Arnow-Richman supra note 8, at 39. 
89.   See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2003) (“Termination of a contract by one party except on the 
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party . . . ”). 
90.   See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for 
Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513 (2014) (exploring this analogy). 

















and employers’ lack of control over its consequences. In ordinary times, 
employers retain the ability to manage the effects of economic challenges 
even when they are sudden or unpredictable. Thus, an employer that loses a 
major client can decide whether and how to scale down its operating costs. 
An obligation to provide notice or severance appropriately forces the 
employer to include losses to laid off workers in that calculus.91 
Government shut down orders, by contrast, leave employers no such 
flexibility.   
Such considerations, however, merely provoke questions about how 
severance pay should be funded in times of crisis. In response to the 
pandemic, Congress enacted programs to directly assist employers in 
meeting both pre-existing and newly enacted obligations to employees. 
Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), for instance, 
small and medium-sized92 employers are temporarily obligated to provide 
paid sick leave and expanded Family Medical Leave to workers who are 
unable to work due to a qualifying COVID-related reason.93 The Act grants 
employers a credit against payroll taxes for those expenditures.94 Similarly, 
Congress has advanced forgivable loans to small employers through the 
Payroll Protection Program, which can be used to fund payroll and other 
operating costs during the crisis. 95 The loans will be fully forgiven if used 
for qualified purposes, of which at least sixty percent must be directed 
toward payroll.96 These programs help employers meet their obligations to 
workers who remain employed. Support could similarly be directed to 
employers fulfilling obligations to workers who have been separated. 
 
91.   See Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 40 (“Unsuccessful businesses and dying industries fold; 
other entities reap the benefits of these losses. The pressing question is what will happen to workers in 
the process.”); Lofaso, supra note 42 at 74 (observing that employers are better able to bear the losses 
inherent in closing or reducing operations in response to economic challenges than employees). 
92.   The Act applies to private employers with less than 500 employees. Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 
5110(2)(i)(I), 134 Stat. 199 (2020). 
93.   These include experiencing, quarantining for, or caring for someone with COVID-19, or 
caring for children due to COVID-related school closures. See § 5102(a). 
94.   Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 7001(a), 7003(a), 134 Stat. 178 (2020). 
95.   Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 
1102(a)(2)(A)(viii), 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Other permissible uses of the funds include rent, utilities and 
mortgage payments. 
96.   Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116–142, § 3(b)(2), 134 
Stat. 641 (2020). Initially the amount was seventy-five percent, but was adjusted in response to demands 
from small businesses and interest groups. See Natalie Andrews, Senate Approves Bill Extending 













Indeed, examples of government support provide an additional 
justification for universal severance: triage. Employer payroll is an up-and-
running system that can continue to front funds to employees without resort 
to an outside administrative process. The UI experience has revealed the 
difficulties of achieving timely income continuity through the public 
benefits system. To be sure, the current processing backlog is extraordinary. 
Yet even in the best of times, applicants must anticipate several weeks 
between filing a claim and receiving benefits.97 That combined with the 
waiting period that typically applies in normal times means that workers 
may have to go a month or more without income. Given notoriously low 
savings in the United States, many households are unable to cover such a 
gap.98 Universal severance – with appropriate government support – cleanly 
and quickly puts money into workers’ hands. 
 
 B. Temporary Separation as Legal Status  
 
Once universal severance is in place, the system can better account for 
issues specific to temporary separations in times of economic crisis. In 
enacting a law of layoffs, Congress could create a severance deferral option 
for employers who designate a layoff as temporary and commit to 
reinstating the worker within a designated period of time post-separation. 
Temporary separation status could be linked to UI eligibility, relieving some 
of the challenges facing that system, and could be leveraged to incent 
employers to bring workers back on the job.  
The practice of placing workers on a form of temporary layoff is one 
that supersedes the exigencies of the current crisis. Companies need 
periodic flexibility to let go and rehire workers in the face of any number of 
short-term stresses, ranging from supply chain interruptions, to labor 
stoppages, to natural disasters and shortages. Ordinary downturns might 
 
97.   The Department of Labor advises applicants to anticipate it taking two to three weeks to 
receive their first benefit check. See U.S. DEP’T LAB., How Do I File for Unemployment Insurance?, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/unemployment-insurance [https://perma.cc/43UG-5MBX].  
98.   Over 40% of American households do not have sufficient savings to cover basic expenses for 
three months. See American Savings Promotion Act, Pub. L. No. 113–251, § 2, 128 Stat. 2888 (2014); 
Kim Parker et al., About Half of Lower-Income Americans Report Job or Wage Loss Due to COVID-19, 





















provoke a temporary rather than permanent layoff where the employer 
anticipates that the decline in business will be short-lived. In the context of 
COVID-19, the concept of a temporary separation is particularly apt given 
the unique nature of the interruption: government shutdown orders forced a 
total, but necessarily finite, cessation of operations. In this situation, both 
parties might find the temporary separation concept appealing: the worker 
who would like assurance of future re-employment, and the employer who 
wants to hit the ground running once business resumes.  
Yet in most workplaces, temporary separation is an administrative 
characterization not a legal status. There is no common terminology for the 
phenomenon – workers might be described as idled, furloughed, or on 
“stand by,” among other labels – and it generally confers no legal rights. In 
an at-will system, employers can hire, fire, and rehire at their discretion, 
meaning they have no obligation to bring a worker back, despite 
characterizing the separation as temporary.99 Absent a contractual guarantee 
or other legal overlay, an employer is free to offer work to other applicants 
when it next finds itself in need of labor.100 Thus, an employer might opt to 
hire new help at lower wages rather than reinstate separated workers who 
would expect pay commensurate with their past earning history.   
In the current moment with the UI crisis still in full tilt, such possibilities 
are not the foremost concerns. Yet a handful of cities in California have 
already anticipated this problem. In May 2020, Los Angeles adopted a city 
ordinance requiring employers in certain hard hit-industries to give job 
priority to laid off employees when a new position becomes available.101 
The purpose of the law is to ensure that experienced workers are not 
 
99.   See e.g., Pearson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The 
undisputed fact is that Hancock did no more than terminate (or, in a sense, refuse to reinstitute) an at-
will employment relationship. So viewed, the instant case reduces to a prototypical employment case in 
which one party has exercised its legal right to end a relationship with no stated term.”); cf. Cesarini v. 
FCA US, LLC, No. 342674, 2019 WL 2711584, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. June 27, 2019) (“[B]ecause 
plaintiff remained an at-will employee while on leave, she had no basis for asserting that defendant 
breached its contract with her by not reinstating her after her leave of absence ended.”). 
100 .  See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 426 (1st Cir. 1996) (“A contract to reinstate an 
at-will employee to an at-will position (from which she could immediately be removed without cause) 
is no contract at all.”); accord Kvintus v. RL Polk & Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797-98 (E.D. Mich. 1998).  
101.   L.A., Cal., Ordinance 186602 (Apr. 29, 2020). The city also passed a related ordinance 
imposing retention obligations on successor companies following a change in ownership or control. 












replaced by “newer, cheaper” labor when the economy comes back.102 
Employers in the airport, events and hospitality, and commercial building 
services industries must recall any covered worker laid off for COVID-
related reasons for any job that is the same or similar to the one he or she 
previously held prior to offering the position to a new hire.103 Workers 
wrongfully denied hiring preference can sue for reinstatement.104 Since the 
Los Angeles initiative, several other California cities in the state have 
followed suit.105 
The rights conferred by the L.A. ordinance and its progeny are 
reminiscent of the separation terms typically contained in collective 
bargaining agreements governing unionized workplaces. Such agreements 
often have elaborate layoff and recall provisions that revolve around 
seniority.106 Workers are generally laid off in reverse seniority order (last-
in, first-out), then recalled in order of seniority.107 In some cases, an 
agreement may contain a blanket prohibition on the hiring of new 
employees if there are laid off workers who desire and are capable of 
performing the needed work.108 Such clauses create enforceable contract 
rights actionable under the National Labor Relations Acts.109 
Short of creating a comparable direct mandate, a law of layoffs could 
incent rehire by granting employers a complete or partial severance deferral 
option in the case of a temporary separation. Such is the law in much of 
Canada. Under Canadian provincial law, absent employee misconduct or 
 
102.   Alene Tchekmedyian & Colleen Shalby, Garcetti Pushes Law Protecting Displaced Workers 
from Being Replaced by Cheaper Labor, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-21/garcetti-pushes-for-law-protecting-seniority-of-
workers-displaced-by-coronavirus [https://perman.cc/8Y6A-ZV4R]. 
103.   L.A., Cal., Ordinance 186602 at § 200.32. The obligation also applies to non-similar jobs for 
which the laid off worker is qualified or could become qualified through the same training that would 
be provided to a new hire. Id. If more than one laid off worker is eligible for a position, preference goes 
to the one with greater seniority. Id. 
104.   Id. at § 200.33(A). They can also obtain compensatory and punitive damages and costs and 
attorneys’ fees. Id. 
105.   See Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13,607 (July 21, 2020); S.F., Cal., Ordinance 104-20 (June 18, 
2020); Long Beach, Cal., Code ch. 5.55.030 (2020); San Diego, Cal., Code ch. 3, art. 11, div. 1, § 
311.0104(a) (2020). 
106.   See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 8 (drawing on this analogy in arguing for statutory 
notice/severance obligations). 
107.   COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS MANUAL, BLOOMBERG LAW §§ 
117.1132, 117.125 (last visited Sept. 29,2020). 
108.   Id. at § 117.125. 
109.   29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 

















other exceptions,110 employers must either provide advance notice of any 
termination or else pay the worker for the requisite notice period.111 The 
latter obligation, referred to as pay-in-lieu-of-notice (PILN) or termination 
pay, is effectively a severance requirement. However, in some jurisdictions, 
employers can avoid these obligations by placing a worker on a “temporary 
lay-off.” For instance, in Ontario, the largest Canadian province by 
population, an employer is not required to provide notice or pay to 
employees laid off for fewer than thirteen weeks.112 If the employee is not 
restored to work, the temporary layoff is converted to a termination, 
triggering the employer’s payment obligation.113 
The value of a formal temporary separation status to employers is that 
it provides an additional option for those who can neither provide advance 
notice nor pay its equivalent. Such might be the case, for instance, where 
the employer faces a sudden or precipitous need to reduce its workforce. If 
economic pressures abate and the employer is able to restore the worker, it 
avoids its outstanding severance obligation entirely. For the worker’s part, 
he or she gains an enforceable right to reinstatement, rather than a mere 
 
110.   Ontario Reg. 288/01 s. 2(1).  Notably, subsection (4) of the regulation creates an exception 
where the “contract of employment has become impossible to perform or has been frustrated by a 
fortuitous or unforeseeable event or circumstance.” Id. As discussed, infra, Canadian jurisdictions have 
responded to the COVID unemployment crisis by expanding temporary layoff provisions. However, this 
exception, which essentially codifies the common law impossibility doctrine, see Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts §§ 261, 265 (Am. L. Inst. 1981), provides another failsafe that could conceivably apply to 
the current or a comparable future situation. 
111.   See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, 2000 S.O., c. 41, s. 54, 61 (Ontario). In Canada, such 
statutory obligations exist alongside common law requirements that require “reasonable” notice of 
termination or pay in lieu thereof (known as “PILN”). See generally DAVID DOOREY, THE LAW OF 
WORK 327–28 (2d ed. 2020); GEOFFREY ENGLAND, ESSENTIALS OF CANADIAN LAW: INDIVIDUAL 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 289–324 (2d ed. 2008). 
112.   Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000 c 41, s 56(2)(a) (Ontario); see also Canada Labour 
Standards Regulations, C.R.C., c. 986, s. 30(1)(c) (Can) (permitting temporary layoff of three months 
or less for federal jurisdiction employees).  Temporary status in Ontario may be extended up to thirty-
five weeks if the employer provides some amount of continued pay or benefits, and the statute permits 
unions and management to agree to lengthier arrangements. Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO c 41, 
s 56(2)(b) & (c). 
113.   The effect is similar to what occurs under the WARN Act. The statute excludes separations of 
six months or less from the statute’s definition of “employment loss.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6); supra 
Part I.  Once the employer knows that the separation will exceed that period of time, it must comply 
with the Act’s notice obligations. See EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.OR, THE 
WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT: EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF CLOSINGS AND LAYOFFS 5 (2003), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/Layoff/pdfs/_EmployerWARN2003.pdf 












expectation of rehire, or else the balance of severance owed. During the 
intervening period the worker and employer maintain attachment by virtue 
of the formal status designation and the prospect of reemployment. 
Of course, this type of deferral option, if adopted in isolation, would 
ensure rather than rectify the income continuity problem at the heart of the 
COVID-19 employment crisis. If a new law of layoffs were to permit 
employers to fully defer required severance pay, workers might find 
themselves without pay and facing the type of UI backlog currently 
plaguing COVID-affected workers in future times of high unemployment. 
It could also create a firm-side moral hazard problem, incenting employers 
to make use of the public benefits system as a means of temporarily reducing 
labor costs.114 
There are several ways that the system could be designed to mitigate 
this problem. One would be to permit only a partial severance deferral. 
Employers would be obligated to provide at least a portion of the severance 
pay otherwise owed, either a reduced number of days or weeks’ wages or a 
percentage of the full amount. Another option would be to pair deferral with 
administrative changes that hasten workers’ access to UI. There is currently 
no system-wide mechanism for exempting temporary separations from 
work-search eligibility requirements.115 Applicants must navigate their 
state’s idiosyncratic requirements or exemption process, compounding the 
complexity of accessing benefits.116 A federal severance deferral option 
would create a formal, standardized designation of temporary status that all 
states could rely on to qualify applicants automatically.117  
As a further step, the law could place some of the administrative burden 
of obtaining UI on employers who opt to defer severance. Employers will 
often have the resources and experience to interface with the UI system 
 
114.   See Pandya, supra note 65 at 909 (describing the “employer-side moral hazard problem [in 
which] employers shift their labor costs onto UI by laying off workers temporarily during [economic 
slumps], intending to rehire them when business improves”) (emphasis omitted). 
115.   As previously described, some states have temporarily suspended these requirements in 
response to COVID. See supra Part II.B. 
116.   States have differing rules about such things as whether and how temporary status must be 
certified, how long an employee can remain on temporary status, and whether a return date must be 
specified.  
117.   Cf. 20 C.F.R. 204.5(a)(3) (deeming workers on temporary layoff as satisfying the “available 
for work” UI eligibility requirement). 

















more easily than individual employees.118 In situations where employers 
place multiple workers on temporary status, an employer-managed 
application process would improve efficiency, relieving state services 
offices of some of the administrative burden of handling numerous 
individual applications.119 Congress could also require employers to submit 
a temporary layoff plan, similar to what is required for state-level “short-
time” compensation programs.120  This would encourage the employer to 
carefully consider its short- and long-term labor needs, and provide an 
additional layer accountability with respect to the duration of the separation 
and the employer’s recall plans.  
Finally, the law could combine a partial payment requirement with an 
employer administrative role to achieve continuity between severance and 
UI. Employers could be given responsibility for facilitating workers’ access 
to public benefits along with the obligation to pay severance up until the 
first benefit check arrives. This would incent prompt filing by the employer, 
as well as continued oversight of the state agency process, that could lead 
to more timely administration of claims. Most importantly, it would 
eliminate the gap between notice of layoff and receipt of benefits, helping 
temporarily separated workers stay afloat at a time of transition and loss. 
  
 
118.   For instance, larger employers are likely to have human resources personnel who have 
experience with UI as well as with other public insurance systems like workers compensation. 
119.   Involving employers in the application process might also be administratively beneficial in 
the “experience rating” process, whereby the state social security system seeks roughly to align 
employers’ individual tax rates with the amount of unemployment they cause. See Pandya, supra note 
65 at 926–28 (describing flaws in the experience rating system that may insufficiently disincent 
employer reliance on temporary hiring and firing in managing labor costs). Regardless, it will be 
important to pair the deferral option proposed here with appropriate adjustments to the experience rating 
process to avoid any increase in firm-side moral hazard. See id. at 909. 
120.   The little-used short time compensation (“STC”) program is designed to encourage employers 
to institute across-the-board hours reductions rather than layoffs by providing a pro-rated benefit to 
affected workers in partial compensation for their lost work hours. See generally JULIE WHITAKER, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMPENSATED WORK SHARING ARRANGEMENTS (SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION) 
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LAYOFFS, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40689.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA3L-
4SRT] (describing history of the program and current requirements); see also Sanchin S. Pandya, Short-
Time Compensation in WORK LAW UNDER COVID-19 (2020) (explaining the intersection between STC 
and federal pandemic legislation). To take advantage of the program, employers must submit a plan 
detailing such things as the number of affected workers and amount of hours reduced in conformity with 
the program limits, see WHITAKER, supra note 120 at 2 , and in some states, can apply for benefits on 














Prescription in a time of crisis is a dangerous thing. There is likely no 
amount of legislative forethought that would have prepared the country for 
the COVID-19 employment crisis, nor is it wise to allow such aberrational 
circumstances to dictate policy going forward. At the same time, catastrophe 
exposes structural flaws that can inform future lawmaking. The sheer 
absence of any separation rights or ready source of income continuity for 
workers terminated for economic reasons is a long-neglected problem. Its 
ramifications amidst the pandemic differ in size, but not in kind. 
This article has proposed a law of layoffs that would fill this regulatory 
gap. Much still remains to be considered. Lawmakers must decide the 
details and parameters of the type of system sketched here, such as the 
duration of notice/severance obligations, the maximum length of temporary 
status, and a myriad of other issues regarding coverage, eligibility, and 
exceptions. Thought must be given to whether employers will fully bear the 
cost of new notice and severance obligations in ordinary times,121 as well as 
to how they might be supported in truly calamitous moments.122 Ultimately, 
there may be circumstances that require serious deviations from the law 
proposed here.123 However, a first step is to change the baseline for how 
economic terminations are effected. No individual should be separated from 
his or her sole source of income on a moment’s notice without any economic 
cushion and only uncertain access to the public safety net. Establishing that 




121.   One possibility would be to give favorable tax treatment to amounts paid as severance in the 
same way that current tax law treats benefits paid through ERISA-qualifying plans. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 
s501(c)(25)(C)(i) (granting corporate tax exemption to qualified pension, profit sharing, and stock bonus 
plans). 
122.   As previously noted, Congress appropriated funds to support workers and businesses during 
the pandemic in a variety of ways, including by providing forgivable loans to small employers to support 
payroll. See supra Part III.A. The question of how to most effectively direct limited funds in times of 
economic hardship like the present moment is one beyond the scope of this article. 
123.   In Canada, for instance, provinces have adjusted and suspended parts of their termination laws 
to give employers more leeway to place workers on temporary layoff or alternative statuses in order to 
postpone termination pay.  See, e.g., O. Reg. 228/20R.S.A. 63.1 (Ontario) (deeming workers laid off 
during COVID-19 to be on emergency infectious disease leave); RSA 2000, c E-9, s 63.1(2) (Alberta) 
(expanding limits on temporary layoff from 90 days to 180 days). 
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